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Abstract 
People are capable of understanding the suffering of distant others and of their personal 
responsibility in this suffering. The communication of harm and self-responsibility in 
the suffering of others leads to greater moral sensitivity. Two studies were carried out to 
test our hypotheses. In Study 1 we analyse the emotional response to the scripts using a 
correlational study. In Study 2 we use functional MRI to investigate brain activation 
associated with the communication of harm and self-responsibility in a moral scenario 
on supportive communication. Direct comparison between donor and protest scenarios 
yielded a significant activation in the left amygdala usually associated with moral 
emotions. Responses in supportive communication scenarios show that donors can feel 
personally involved in a moral issue if they perceive the harm and their self-
responsibility. Our results suggest that the creation of a communications structure based 
on social condemnation increases moral sensitivity to poverty. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The present paper seeks to shed light on the processing differences associated with 
moral sensitivity to helping social groups. To this end, we use the impersonal dilemma 
on whether to act to prevent the suffering of distant others and compare the emotional 
response, at subjective and neural levels. Relying on the communicative structure of a 
collective message, we compare two communication scenarios associated whith 
impersonal dilemmas: donor scenario and protest scenario.  
Moral sensitivity represents a person’s capacity to detect and interpret moral questions 
(Moll, Oliver-Souza, Garrido, Bramati, Caparelli-Daquer, Paiva, Zahn, & Grafman, 
2007). Moral psychology has recently studied the conditions in which people are 
sensitive to requests for help when moral rules are violated (Haidt, 2003; Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene, 2003; Prinz, 2007). Moral 
dilemmas vary in the degree to which they engage emotional processing and this 
engagement influences moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001). These studies find that 
people feel emotionally involved in dilemmas of help in which the giver has a direct 
link with the recipient and denial of help causes physical harm to the person asking for 
help (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, 2003). Emotional 
processing does not affect the neural response to moral dilemmas if there is no moral 
condemnation associated with the refusal of help. The absence of a direct personal link 
has been proposed as the main reason for this lack of emotional response (Greene, et al., 
2001; & Haidt, 2002). The perception of responsibility in the link with the recipient 
may have the same emotional effect as a direct physical relationship. In this study, we 
explore the conditions in which the communication of harm resulting from denial of 
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help, may be a cognitive factor that engages emotional processing in an anonymous 
social context (scenario) where there is no direct link with the donor. 
When a moral rule is judged to have been violated, the neural structures are activated to 
process a negative emotional response associated with the disapproval of this violation 
(Greene et al., 2001). This emotional activation varies according to whether the person 
thinks s/he has some direct responsibility for the violation of the moral norm (Greene et 
al., 2004). In moral scenarios in which the recipient of help is an anonymous, distant 
other, people find it difficult to judge as immoral the harm that denying help can cause, 
and to become emotionally involved (Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002). The 
communication strategies used by many of the large international NGOs tend to 
emphasize the role of the other’s suffering, and draw attention to the need donate to an 
NGO to alleviate this suffering, exposing the recipient to a donor scenario (Benthall, 
2010; CONCORD, 2007; Sogge, 1996). The absence of a direct, physical link with the 
recipient of help is typical of the donor scenario, and is therefore considered to be an 
impersonal moral dilemma, in which personal responsibility (self-responsibility) for the 
moral harm is indirect (Greene et al., 2001; Greene, 2003).  The personal distance 
between the donor and the recipient is therefore physical, because of the nature of the 
dilemma, and psychological, because of the impersonal neural response reported by 
Greene et al. (2001).  
The donation reaches the recipient the through an intermediary, who appears as directly 
responsible for the moral repair of the harm. The donor scenario places the donor in a 
situation in which s/he appears as responsible for the well-being of an anonymous 
person, but not directly responsible for the cause of the moral harm. In this context the 
request for help does not include any relevant information implicating the donor in the 
situation that is causing harm to the recipient. The collective nature of the request for 
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help, therefore, might not be the only factor that inhibits the donor’s emotional 
involvement. Attribution of self-responsibility for moral harm may be a relevant factor 
associated with the moral response. People can feel responsible for harm they have not 
inflicted themselves if they consider it has been perpetrated by someone from their own 
reference group, and they regard the harm caused as meriting condemnation 
(Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Branscombe, 2004; Wohl & Branscombe, 
2008). A variation of the donor scenario that cognitively links the donor with the 
recipient’s suffering would therefore be expected to activate the neural response typical 
of personal moral dilemmas. 
The concept of protest, however, emphasises the need to help impoverished countries 
by attributing direct responsibility for their precarious resources to the donors 
themselves. This differentiation contributes an aspect that is not covered in the 
differentiation between personal and impersonal moral dilemmas made by Greene et al. 
(2001, 2004): the direct responsibility for an action that merits condemnation as a link 
between the donor and the recipient. The protest scenario overcomes physical distance 
by bringing the donor and the recipient cognitively closer, thus enabling a more 
significant emotional response. This narrowing of the cognitive distance means, in 
practice, increased moral sensitivity to the situation, which can be seen in the 
correlatively activated neural structure 
In the donor scenario not helping can generate an unpleasant feeling of guilt, by 
performing an action that is not morally acceptable, the consequence of which is the 
other’s suffering (Greene, 2004; Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994; Lazarus, 
1991). Guilt is a self-conscious moral emotion, part of which is the thought of 
responsibility for harming the other (Lazarus, 1991); the person is aware of his or her 
responsibility in a moral transgression that harms others if he or she does not do the 
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right thing (Lazarus, 1991, Baumeister et al., 2004). In the donor scenario, the person 
anticipates feeling guilty if he or she does not help the other. The appeal for help is thus 
managed as a problem to be resolved. The person approaches the question of whether to 
help or not as a problem of choosing between two options: a) not to give money and 
then feel guilty as a result; and b) to give money and then forget the problem. Guilt is 
anticipated, the person has to decide in order to prevent it, and as such the socio-
emotional circuit is key to the response. In the donor scenario, the person will be 
responsible for the harm caused if he or she does not act, by not helping someone in 
need, and by not taking responsibility for resolving the situation. By helping, he or she 
is no longer responsible for the situation facing the person requesting help, and can turn 
his or her back on and disengage from the problem that led to the appeal. In contrast to 
the donor scenario, the protest scenario provides a communication structure in which 
the audience can judge their own self-responsibility in the possibility of acting to 
resolve the problem, by pressurizing their reference group to prevent the conditions that 
lead to the problem. These judgments will be associated with aversive emotions of 
condemnation such as guilt or/and indignation over the harm caused. Emotions of 
condemnations like indignation are critical in the response to the breach of moral norms 
(Haidt, 2003). They arise when the moral codes affecting the community are violated. 
These emotions tend to lead to action by inducing pro-social responses such as helping 
others (Haidt, 2003; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, Moll & Ignacio, 2005); they form part of 
the state in which the person has to take his or her decision, which implies that the 
socio-emotional circuit is directly involved. 
Robertson, Snarey, Ousley, Harenski, Bowman, Gilkey and Kilts (2007) have reported 
that sensitivity to moral issues correlates with the activation of the polar medial 
prefrontal cortex, dorsal posterior cingulate cortex, and posterior superior temporal 
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sulcus (STS). Personal dilemmas generally involve regions of the brain associated with 
emotion; the amygdala is particularly important, but the mPFC (medial Pre-Frontal 
Cortex) and dorsal posterior cingulate cortex are also relevant (Greene et al., 2001; 
Greene et al., 2004). Impersonal dilemmas, on the other hand, involve regions such as 
the DLFPC (Dorso Lateral Fronto Parietal Cortex), which are linked to cognitive 
control (Greene, et al., 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Although the role of emotions in 
moral judgments is still unclear (Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2008), the amygdala 
emerges as the principle brain structure carrying out an essential role in regulating 
social emotions, as well as emotions related to indignation over unjust acts (Adolphs, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1998; Adolphs, 2002, 2003). The amygdala could be a critical area 
in comparing the two supportive communication scenarios because of its particular and 
critical role in activating emotional responses to actions that physically harm others, 
and/or where intentional moral transgressions are present (Berthoz, Grezes, Armony, 
Passingham, & Dolan, 2006; Luo, Nakic, Wheatley, Richell, Martin, & Blair, 2006; 
Heekeren, Wartenburger, Schmidt, Prehn, Schwintowski, & Villringer, 2005; Greene, 
2009). Attribution of personal responsibility for the action of a social group may 
increase moral sensitivity to the situation, by allowing the socio-emotional response to 
modulate to the context (Moll et al., 2007; Zahn, Moll, Paiva, Garrido, Krueger, Huey, 
& Grafman, 2009). One social group scenario that involves greater attribution of 
personal responsibility for harm to another person, associated with personal moral 
judgment, is the protest scenario. In this context, the denouncement of an unjust 
situation, together with attribution of self-responsibility as a member of the group 
causing the harm, would lead to a demand for protest as a way of condemning the 
situation.  
The role of self-responsibility 
We hypothesise that aversive emotional response will be more intense in the protest 
scenario than in the donor scenario. This negative response will be manifest both at a 
self-reporting level (Study 1) and in the activation of brain areas associated with 
aversive processing such as the amygdala (Study 2). We hypothesise that activation of 
the amygdala will be more intense in the context of helping social groups in the protest 
scenario than in the donor scenario. 
Method. 
Study 1  
Participants 
247 undergraduates (173 females and 74 males; mean age = 22.30; range 19-36) were 
studied, all of whom had given their prior informed consent. 115 undergraduates 
responded to the donor scenario scripts, 132 undergraduates responded to the protest 
scenario scripts.  
Scripts 
Twelve scripts (action scenarios) were prepared to evoke the experience of protest (6 
protest scripts) and donation (6 donor scripts). The donor scripts were based on a 
preliminary analysis of advertising used by some large NGOs (e.g., Amnesty 
International, UNICEF, Intermon Oxfam). Public denouncements of transnational 
corporations’ actions in their business activities (Werner & Weiss, 2003) were used in 
the preparation of the protest scripts. All the scripts (see Table 1) began with a sentence 
to indicate their content: ‘Thousands of people urgently need help to survive’ for the 
donor scripts and ‘It is unjust and outrageous’ for the protest scripts. The content of 
these 12 scripts was evaluated by 23 experts (students and/or professionals from the 
area of cooperation) who were asked to decide which category the scripts belonged to, 
without being given any identifying labels. The experts reached a unanimous decision 
The role of self-responsibility 
on 11 of the 12 scripts, classifying them in the category to which they had originally 
been assigned. Script A6 from the protest category was classified correctly by 91% of 
the expert panel.  
(Table 1 about here) 
The design of both the scenarios was based on the presentation of the donor 
dilemma in the study of Greene et al. (2001). In Greene et al.’s (2001) work, the 
structure of donor dilemma includes the presentation of the social problem and the 
demand for action. In our study, the scripts are structured similarly. We have designed 
them as a variation of the donor dilemma. In this variation, we have attempted to create 
a situation that more closely represents a social communication scenario. The study by 
Greene et al. (2001) does not employ social communication analysis, but rather presents 
the dilemma as a moral problem confronting the individual faced with the possibility to 
help anonymous beings with whom he/she has no physical contact (impersonal 
dilemmas). By presenting this dilemma as a communication scenario, the very dilemma 
and action are linked dialectically, suggesting that associating the protest dilemma with 
a demand for monetary action would, in the communicative structure, result negatively 
and be of little credibility, thereby adversely affecting the public’s response. Other 
message or contextualisation formulas may have different effects, although we used this 
formula to differentiate the context of personal responsibility (protest dilemma) from 
one of psychological distance from the problem (donor dilemma). Each scenario was 
differentiated by an opening phrase that contextualised the scenario in which the donor 
had to act. The test to evaluate recognition of the differences between the two scenario 
types verified that the subjects clearly saw the differences between the two contexts 
Procedure 
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Each of the 12 scripts was presented separately to groups of between 17 and 24 
participants such that each participant only evaluated one script. Written scripts were 
given to the participants to read, and they were then asked to evaluate their emotional 
state on a scale of 1 to 7, based on a list of five positive and five negative adjectives. 
The emotional state has been assessed from a list of potential emotions that could be 
triggered by the scripts. A first group of  negative emotions (ashamed, guilty, disgusted, 
angry and indignant), because individuals  respond emotionally with aversion or 
rejection towards the object or situation that  triggers its appearance. A second group of 
positive emotions (cheerful, encouraged, compassionate, hopeful, y happy). 
They were also asked to assess the degree of morality of the script by evaluating, on a 
scale of 1 to 7, the following statement: ‘I think it is immoral to do nothing to prevent 
this situation’. The questionnaire was given to the students in class, following an 
explanation and request for permission from the students and their lecturers.  
Results and Discussion 
The results of the emotional evaluations enabled us to calculate the positive and 
negative affect scores for responses to each scenario. We carried out an exploratory 
factor analysis using the principal components and varimax rotation procedures. This 
analysis resulted in a two-factor solution with an eigenvalue above 1, coinciding with 
the positive and negative emotions. The explained variance of the factor solution is 
61.474%. The factor loading for the positive emotions factor oscillated between .566 
and .891, while that for the negative emotions factor was between .582 and .873. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the negative emotions factor was .807 and for the positive 
emotions, .777.  A 2x2 ANOVA was performed using affect type (positive vs. negative) 
as the within-subjects factor and scenario (protest vs. donor) as the between-subjects 
factor. As expected, in the scenario factor in relation to positive affect (F=4.559*), the 
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donor scenario (M=2.113; d.t. =1.056) presented greater positive affect than protest 
scenario (M=1.854; d.t. =.824), and the analysis of the negative affect revealed 
significant differences (F=10.135**): the protest scenario presented greater negative 
affect (M=4.383; d.t. =1.288) than the donor scenario (M=3.856; d.t. =1.249). 
The results of the differences for each item are presented in Table 2. On analyzing the 
adjectives, the evaluation of the protest group was more negative than the donor group 
for four of the five negative adjectives: disgust, anger, shame and indignation. In 
general there were no differences between the two scenario types with regard to the 
positive emotional states. Only in the case of the adjective ‘hope’ was a lower score 
obtained in the protest than in the donor scenario (see Table 2).  
(Table 2 about here) 
Significant differences were, however, found in the scenario factor (F=5.533; p<.05) 
regarding the evaluation of the morality of refusing help; the protest scenario revealed a 
higher perception of immorality for denying help in the script (M=5.832; d.t.=1.376) 
than the donor scenario (M=5.409; d.t.=1.444). 
The second study was designed to compare the two scenarios at the level of brain 
response.  
Study 2 
Participants 
Eighteen undergraduates (8 females; mean age = 21.90; range 19-31) were studied, all 
of whom had given their written informed consent. The experiment was approved by 
the Ethics Committee of the University Jaume I. All subjects were right-handed 
according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), and did not report 
any neurological and psychiatric disorders.  
fMRI paradigm 
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Participants were required to watch an 8-minute film and to remember the auditory 
sentences generated with the software Text Aloud (V. 2.7), using the ‘George’ voice. 
This software guarantees that the same voice, with no prosodic tone, is heard during the 
entire task. Using selected fragments from documentaries, we constructed a single 
videotape consisting of 18 contiguous 20-second segments alternating three different 
conditions: the Protest condition, the Donor condition and the control condition. Both 
Protest and Donor conditions presented videos showing explicit images of poverty in 
the Third World. Two sets of videos were selected and these were counterbalanced 
across subjects. The same messages from Study 1 (see Table 1) were presented within 
each condition according to whether they were  Protest or Donor. All the scripts (see 
Supplementary Information) began with a sentence to indicate their content: ‘Thousands 
of people urgently need help to survive’ for the donor scripts and ‘It is unjust and 
outrageous’ for the protest scripts. Communication of the different help context was 
thereby guaranteed in each scenario type. Finally, the control condition showed black 
screens for 20-second periods. 
A post scan test was used to evaluate attention during the scanning session by a 
recognition test of eighteen written sentences in which the messages heard in the 
scanner were either included or omitted. Sentences were randomly ordered for each 
subject. Twelve of these sentences corresponded to the scripts from the study. Six other 
phrases with content unrelated to the study, were interspersed among the scripts. The 
test asked subjects to answer “yes” or “no” if they had previously heard these sentences 
during the scanner session. 
  fMRI Acquisition 
 Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) fMRI data were acquired on a 1.5T 
Siemens Avanto (Erlangen, Germany). Subjects were placed in the MRI scanner in a 
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supine position. Their heads were immobilised with cushions to reduce motion artifact. 
The stimuli were directly presented using Visuastim XGA goggles with a resolution of 
800 x 600 (Resonance Technologies, Inc). Vision correction was used whenever 
necessary.  
A gradient-echo T2*-weighted echo-planar MR sequence was used for fMRI in both 
tasks (TE= 50 ms, TR= 3000 ms, flip angle = 90º, matrix= 64 x 64, voxel size = 3.94 x 
3.94 x 6, with 5 mm thickness and 1 mm gap). We acquired 29 interleaved axial slices 
parallel to the anterior-posterior commissure (AC-PC) plane covering the entire brain. 
Prior to the functional MR sequence, an anatomical 3D volume was acquired using a 
T1-weighted gradient echo pulse sequence (TE= 4.9 ms; TR=11 ms; FOV= 24 cm; 
matrix= 256 x 224 x 166; voxel size= 1 x 1 x 1). 
fMRI data analysis 
The data were analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM5). For each subject, 
the first two scans in each run were excluded from the analysis to discount artifacts 
related to the transient phase of magnetisation. Motion correction to the first functional 
scan was performed with subjects using a six-parameter rigid-body transformation. All 
the individuals’ anatomical images were co-registered to the mean of their functional 
images using a rigid-body transformation. Images were then spatially normalised to the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template conforming to the Talairach orientation 
system by applying a 12-parameter affine transformation followed by nonlinear warping 
using basis functions. The computed transformation parameters were applied to all the 
functional images, interpolating to a final voxel size of 3 × 3 × 3 mm3. Subsequently, 
images were spatially smoothed with a 6 mm isotropic Gaussian kernel.  
A two-stage procedure was used for the statistical analysis. At the first level (fixed 
effects), the fMRI data from each individual participant were used to generate statistical 
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contrast images after comparing brain activation between each experimental condition 
and the control condition (Protest>Control Condition; Donor>Control Condition). The 
whole brain voxelwise analysis of main task-related effects was studied using a 
statistical threshold of p < 0.05 FWE corrected for multiple comparison, and an extent 
threshold of 216 mm3 across the whole brain.  
To test our hypothesised higher activation in the amygdala for the Protest condition than 
the Donor condition, the region-of interest (ROI) analysis with small volume (SV) 
correction (Worsley, Marrett, Neelin, Vandal, Friston, Evans, 1996) was carried out for 
the direct contrast of Protest>Donor conditions. The amygdalas were defined bilaterally 
as a ROI with the Anatomical Automatic Labeling (AAL) atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer, 
Landeau, Papathanassiou, Crivello, Etard, Delcroix, Mazoyer & Joliot, 2002) as 
implemented in the WFU PickAtlas toolbox (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraf, Burdette, 2003) 
for SPM5. Statistical significance of brain activation within our ROI was defined 
unilaterally at p<0.05, FWE small volume correction. Furthermore, we conducted a 
whole brain voxelwise analysis to test for any other functional differences between 
these two conditions (Protest vs. Donor), at the same statistical thresholds applied to 
study task-related activations (p<0.005, uncorrected; extent threshold = 216 mm3) 
Results 
All participants correctly identified more than 89% of the sentences in the post-scan 
test. As expected, viewing the experimental videos produced strong brain activations in 
the occipital, temporal and parietal areas, as well as the thalamus (see Table 3; Figure 
1).  
(Table 3 about here) 
(Figure 1 about here) 
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Also in line with expectations, the Protest> Donor comparison yielded a significant 
activation in the left amygdala (x, y, z MNI coordinates = -27, -4, -12; Z=3.20, p<0.05 
FWE small volume correction). In an additional whole brain voxelwise analysis, we 
found significant activations in limbic and temporal areas including the 
parahippocampal gyrus and the middle temporal lobe (p<0.005, uncorrected; Table 4). 
Likewise, the reverse contrast (Donor>Protest) activated cortical and cingulate areas 
(see Table 5).  Contrast activations for the whole brain direct voxelwise comparisons 
between Protest and Donor conditions appear in Figure 2. 
(Table 4 and 5 about here) 
(Figure 2 about here) 
Discussion 
The study was designed to compare emotional response to two variations of the  
supportive communication scenario. We aimed to shed light on the differences in neural 
processing related to moral sensitivity to helping groups, associated with contextual 
differences. The classic scenario used to analyse moral response to the request for help 
for social groups emphasises the request for money to alleviate precarious economic 
situations. The question that the study attempted to clarify is twofold: firstly, to explore 
the question of whether the communicative strategy based on the donor scenario 
sensitises its audience in a moral way; and secondly, whether alternative 
communication strategies can be proposed that have a greater potential for developing 
moral sensitivity. 
We hypothesised that aversive emotional response would be more intense in the 
personal responsibility scenario than in the scenario with no responsibility, due to the 
moral condemnation of a situation in which a conduct causes harm to another. Our 
results show that this negative response is manifest both at the self-report level (Study 
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1) and in the activation of brain areas associated with aversive socio-emotional 
processing like the amygdala (Study 2). Coinciding with studies on moral sensitivity 
and donor behaviour, (Greene et al. 2001) our results suggest that communication 
strategies based on the donor scenario activate a more emotionally disengaged decision 
mechanism. This response is in line with the view of poverty as a rational problem to be 
solved, involving little empathy or moral comprehension of the harm caused to the 
other. The communication strategy based on the protest scenario, however, appears as a 
motivator of the decision-making process in which the socio-emotional circuit has a 
greater presence. This presence of the socio-emotional circuits reveals that the person 
feels more emotionally involved as a result of the harm he or she perceives the other to 
suffer. 
In Study 1, the protest condition involves a greater degree of aversive emotional 
response, particularly moral condemnation such as anger, disgust or indignation. These 
emotions are generated in response to communication of a violation of moral norms, 
although indignation appears to be more closely linked to socio-emotional circuits 
(Haidt, 2003; Moll, Oliveira-Souza, Moll, Ignacio, Bramatic, Caparelli-Dáquer, Egas, & 
Eslinger, 2005). In the protest condition, rejection of the situation of poverty generates a 
negative emotional response. These findings suggest that the donor is more involved in 
the recipient’s problem when s/he considers the situation merits condemnation and takes 
responsibility for its cause. This emotional involvement may be due to a sense of 
individual responsibility for group motives; the donor, as a member of the reference 
group that has caused the harm, perceives herself as an agent of that harm (Branscombe, 
Doosje, & McGarty, 2002).  
The design of both the scenarios was based on the presentation of the donor dilemma in 
the study of Greene et al. (2001). In Greene et al.’s (2001) work the structure of donor 
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dilemma includes the presentation of the social problem and the demand for action. In 
our study, the scripts are structured similarly. We have designed them as a variation of 
the donor dilemma. In this variation, we have attempted to create a situation that more 
closely represents a social communication scenario. The study by Greene et al. (2001) 
does not employ social communication analysis, but rather presents the dilemma as a 
moral problem confronting the individual faced with the possibility to help anonymous 
beings with whom he/she has no physical contact (impersonal dilemmas). By presenting 
this dilemma as a communication scenario, the very dilemma and action are linked 
dialectically, suggesting that associating the protest dilemma with a demand for 
monetary action would, in the communicative structure, result negatively and be of little 
credibility, thereby adversely affecting the public’s response. Other message or 
contextualisation formulas may have different effects, although we used this formula to 
differentiate the context of personal responsibility (protest dilemma) from one of 
psychological distance from the problem (donor dilemma). 
The study’s results introduce a new element in the understanding of how the violation 
of moral norms can give rise to moral emotions: the communication of personal 
responsibility for harm to another person with whom there is no physical connection. 
The protest scenario ‘personalises’ the problem of the group to a greater degree, and 
brings it closer to the donor. We therefore consider that these results contribute further 
evidence of the role of supportive communication in raising moral sensitivity to social 
group problems. The results allow for an interpretation that a moral question may be 
more moral if there is condemnation of the situation and responsibility for having 
caused it. Our findings appear to suggest the existence of a societal link between moral 
norms communication and emotional activation.  
The role of self-responsibility 
The two scenarios analyzed in this paper vary in their emphasis in one or other aspect 
when they appeal for a response from the recipient. The donor scenario focuses on 
suffering caused by poverty, while the protest scenario highlights the social 
condemnation of the injustice of poverty. In both scenarios (donor and protest) the 
moral problem is the same: prevention of group suffering among distant, anonymous 
others resulting from a lack of economic resources. The variation in the direct 
communication of harm and self-responsibility changes the neural response.  
This neural behaviour suggests that the moral emotion follows a prior judgement of the 
situation. The observer rejects the situation that has caused the other’s suffering when 
she sees herself as an agent of that suffering, and similar emotions surface as those that 
would emerge if she were suffering injustice herself (anger, disgust, indignation). But 
perhaps this perceptive effect loses moral interest with habit. Future research should 
examine in greater depth the knowledge of how awareness of shared responsibility 
and/or blame can help to understand moral behaviour in help for groups in accordance 
with emotional response. When we have to help someone physically near us, the result 
of our help can be seen the moment we act. However, in social group problems, no 
direct positive reinforcement is obtained for the help offered, and the repeated 
experience of donating is often accompanied by the perception that the donation does 
not fulfil the purpose for which it was made. Perhaps the absence of a direct relationship 
with the outcome of the help given could be affecting the neural response and the moral 
judgement of the situation, and not the direct link with the donor in itself. The protest 
scenario may trigger a more significant emotional response perhaps because there is no 
repeated experience that leads to the perception that the help given is not providing 
results. The importance of the outcome in moral help may affect the moral judgement 
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and the associated moral response; future research should explore in greater detail the 
importance of this factor in both individual and group moral scenarios.  
Practical Implications 
Our results suggest that the creation of a communication structure based on social 
condemnation, which activates indignation about the conditions of poverty, increases 
moral sensitivity to poverty. We suggest that future research might take up the analysis 
of the efficiency of moral sensitivity (once civil society individuals feel motivated to 
act) by communicating proposals, alternatives and possibilities to act to transform the 
perceived injustices. We feel more directly or personally involved if we acknowledge 
that we are the cause of, or responsible for, the situation. Therefore, a communication 
structure that frames the need to help in eradicating poverty and places responsibility on 
the donor can raise moral sensitivity to poverty. This communication strategy involves 
making the donor participate in the problem, without blaming him or her for it, which 
would encourage support for using more personalised education and communication 
strategies in collective messages. Finally, these results suggest the need for more 
participative forms of communication in which mutual recognition of the reasons for 
poverty form part of the debate. In summary, communication structures should allow 
the donor and the recipient to be active agents in their decisions, and open up reciprocal 
debate on their mutual dependencies.. 
Limitations of the study 
In the donor scenario, moral violation occurs when allusions are made to the harm the 
recipient suffers if no donation is given. In the protest scenario, moral violation is 
evidenced through condemnation of the source of the suffering. The donor’s 
responsibility is more explicit in the protest scenario. However, the neural response may 
be due to the initial condemnation of the moral situation in the protest scenario. 
The role of self-responsibility 
Although we believe that this condemnation and the attribution of self-responsibility 
must go together to activate moral sensitisation, the study design does not allow us to 
clearly identify the specific role in moral judgements that attribution of self-
responsibility would have without prior condemnation of the situation. Furthermore, the 
absence of condemnation in the message would assume that there was no real 
differentiation in the donor’s social context. The donor is therefore faced with a context 
that can generate two differentiated conditions. Other message or contextualisation 
formulas may have different effects, although we used this formula to differentiate the 
context of personal responsibility (protest scenario) from one of psychological distance 
from the problem (donor scenario). 
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Table 1 
Translated scripts and frequency of response to each script in the behavioural study 
Donor Group 
Message N 
D1. Thousands of people urgently need help to survive. They do not have 
enough food or water, or any way of getting them for themselves. They 
are victims of war in their countries. With your help we can save women 
and children, victims of armed conflicts, from hunger. Make a donation 
to our NGO! 
 
19 
D2. Thousands of people urgently need help to survive. With your help 
we can halve the number of people living on less than one euro a day. 
Help us to get rid of extreme poverty and hunger. Make a donation to our 
NGO! 
 
20 
D3. Thousands of people urgently need help to survive. Just €12 a month 
can provide 125 vaccinations against measles, an illness that causes 
infant deaths in countries with no resources. This is only one example of 
how you can help us to help them. Make a donation to our NGO! 
 
20 
D4. Thousands of people urgently need help to survive. With your help, 
the number of children registered in primary schools in the developing 
regions where we have been active has increased by 80%. Our target is to 
achieve universal primary education. Make a donation to our NGO! 
 
18 
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D5. Thousands of people urgently need help to survive. Official 
calculations show that 10 million African children die every year from 
causes that can be prevented before they reach their fifth birthday. With 
your help, we can give them the medicines they need. Make a donation to 
our NGO! 
 
17 
D6. Thousands of people urgently need help to survive. With your help, 
we can provide the medical assistance they need. With €10 a year, we 
can send a full surgical team to a country at war or we can vaccinate 400 
children against meningitis. Make a donation to our NGO! 
 
21 
TOTAL 115 
Protest Group 
Message N 
P1. It is unjust and outrageous. Our companies employ children in Laos 
to manufacture cheap training shoes. These children have to work for 
paltry wages in order to eat. Just 36 cents more would enable them to go 
to school and stop working. And we say nothing. Break that silence. 
Protest!  
22 
P2. It is unjust and outrageous. African children are working for our 
Western companies, picking cocoa beans to make chocolate. Our 
companies treat them like slaves; they pay them nothing, so we can buy 
their products at a cheap price. And we say nothing. Break that silence. 
Protest! 
19 
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P3. It is unjust and outrageous. The mineral resources in African 
countries belong to our Western companies. Instead of using them to 
create employment and wealth in the country, our companies hire armies 
to guarantee their slave labour and cheap prices. And we say nothing. 
Break that silence. Protest! 
22 
P4. It is unjust and outrageous. Our companies pay women workers in 
China one euro for a 15-hour shift. They cannot take a day off, and they 
have no social security. These women pay for their food and to sleep in 
the factory. Break the silence. Protest!  
24 
P5. It is unjust and outrageous. The multinational oil companies hire 
armies and bribe governments so they can destroy the livelihood of 
millions of people living on the lands they want to exploit. And we say 
nothing. Break that silence. Protest! 
23 
P6. It is unjust and outrageous. Sports equipment companies spend their 
money on advertising and design. They keep thousands of workers in 
subhuman conditions, but they are not prepared to spend one cent to 
provide decent working conditions in their production plants. Break the 
silence, protest! 
22 
TOTAL 132 
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Table 2 
ANOVA of agency and donor scenarios, according to emotions   
Positive emotions Donor  Protest F 
cheerful 
1.82 
(1.15) 
1.58 
(.98) 
3.07 
encouraged 
2.05 
(1.27) 
1.82 
(1.03) 
2.44 
hopeful 
2.81 
(1.60) 
2.38 
(1.44) 
4.86* 
happy 
1.72 
(1.17) 
1.63 
(.98) 
0.47 
TOTAL 
2.61 
(0.86) 
2.44 
(.71) 
2.69 
Negative emotions Donor  Protest F 
ashamed 
3.94 
(1.88) 
4.82 
(1.71) 
14.49*** 
guilty 
3.03 
(1.56) 
2.88 
1.54) 
0.62 
disgusted 
4.38 
(1.71) 
4.92 
(1.68) 
6.22* 
angry 
3.48 
(1.78) 
4.19 
(1.73) 
9.93** 
indignant 
4.26 
(1.76) 
5.06 
(1.59) 
13.70*** 
TOTAL 3.86 4.38 10.13** 
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(1.24) (1.29) 
*p<.05 **p<.001 ***p<.0001 
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Table 3 
Task-related local maxima for each cluster of significant activation in Protest and Donor 
compared to the control condition (p<0.05; FWE corrected, cluster extent threshold of 
216 mm3). 
X  Y  Z Region of activation Brodmann’s 
area 
Z-score Cluster 
mm3 
Protest>Control Condition   
59 -6 0 Right Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
BA22  7.10 2651 
59 -17 1 Right Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
BA22  6.79  
62 -20      12 Right Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
BA42  5.20  
9 -70       -2 Right Lingual Gyrus BA18  7.08 23976 
-48 -70 1 Left Inferior Temporal 
Gyrus 
  6.56  
12 -86      21 Right Cuneus BA18  6.53  
-59 -17 1 Left Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
BA22  6.16 2997 
-50 -20 1 Left Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
  5.51  
-59 -29 7 Left Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
BA42  5.43  
     
Donor>Control Condition   
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9          -87     18 Right Cuneus BA  18 7.00 31185 
9  -70     -2 Right Lingual Gyrus BA  18 6.46  
12  -86     21 Right Cuneus BA  18 6.08  
-33  -84     10 Left Middle Occipital Gyrus BA  19 6.73  
53  -20     7 Right Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
BA  41 5.92 5886 
65  -17     4 Right Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
BA  22 5.29  
62  -6       0 Right Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
 6.47  
-65  -14     6 Left Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
BA  42 6.26 2511 
-50  -31     13 Left Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
BA  41 5.60  
-62  -6       3 Left Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
BA  22 6.38  
-21  -64     -4 Left Lingual Gyrus BA  19 6.17 513 
-27  -56     -5 Left Parahippocampal 
Gyrus 
BA  19 6.11  
18  -26     1 Right Thalamus  5.57 405 
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Table 4 
Local maxima for each cluster of significantly higher activation in Protest than in Donor 
(p<0.005; uncorrected, cluster extent threshold of 216 mm3). 
X  Y  Z Region of activation Brodmann
’s area 
Z Score Cluster 
mm3 
     
-18  -93   13 Left Occipital Lobe/Cuneus BA 18 3.95 540 
48   -58   8 Right Middle Temporal Gyrus BA 39 3.90 1377 
24   -21  -9 Right Parahippocampal Gyrus BA28 3.87 432 
-30  -35  -6 Left Parahippocampal  Gyrus  
Hippocampus 
 3.44 216 
-30  -36  -13 Left Fusiform Gyrus  2.69  
62   -4    -17 Right Inferior Temporal Gyrus BA 21 3.31 621 
-27  -4    -12 Left Parahippocampal Gyrus   
Amygdala 
 3.20 216 
-48    7   -31 Temporal Lobe Middle 
Temporal Gyrus 
BA 21 3.19 513 
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Table 5 
Local maxima for each cluster of significantly higher activation in Donor than in Protest 
(p<0.005; uncorrected, cluster extent threshold of 216 mm3). 
X  Y  Z Region of activation Brodmann’s 
area 
Z Score Cluster 
mm3 
     
6     -80   37 Right Cuneus BA  19 4.08 2430 
-18  -60   31 Left Precuneus BA  7 3.77  
-6    -80  40 Left Precuneus BA  19 2.81  
3     -31   24 Right Posterior Cingulate BA  23 3.21 648 
-3    -25   29 Left Cingulate Gyrus BA  23 3.04  
3      22   35 Right Cingulate Gyrus BA  32 3.13 459 
12   -65   47 Right Precuneus BA  7 2.84 297 
12   -65   39 Right Precuneus BA  7 2.66  
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Figure 1 
Activation maps overlaid on an anatomical glass brain image for the Protest and Donor 
conditions (p<0.05; FWE corrected).  
Footnote: Colour bar represents contrast value on an intensity scale. Left is left. 
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Figure 2 
Contrast-map activation overlaid on an anatomical glass brain image for the comparison 
between a) Protest condition higher than Donor condition (axial slice shows detailed 
brain activation at amygdala for the whole brain analysis) and b) Donor condition 
higher than Protest condition.   
Footnote: Colour bar represents contrast value on an intensity scale. Left is left. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
